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Abstract. We characterize the equilibrium exchange rate in a general equilibrium economy 
without imposing strong restrictions on the output processes, preferences, or commodity 
market imperfections. The nominal exchange rate is determined by differences in initial 
wealths-the currencies of richer countries tend to be overvalued, by PPP standards-and 
by differences of marginal indirect utilities of total nominal spending. Changes in the 
exchange rate mirror differences in growth rates of real spending weighted by relative risk-
aversion (which can be time-varying and can differ across countries), and, in the case of 
non-homothetic utility functions, differences in inflation rates computed from marginal 
spending weights. Thus, standard regression or cointegration tests of PPP suffer from 
missing-variables biases and ignore variations in risk aversions across countries and over 
time. We also present cointegration test of the homothecy/CRRA version of the model. 
When nominal spending is given an independent role (next to prices) in the short-term 
dynamics, both PPP and the CRRA model become acceptable.  JEL F31 
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European Finance Association Conference for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Relative to the monetary models of the exchange rate, "equilibrium" models offer the advantage 
of being based on mainstream micro-economics and general-equilibrium analysis. 1 Still, these 
equilibrium models of the exchange rate often depend on very specific assumptions about the 
number of goods and countries, the utility functions and production processes, and the type of 
friction in the international goods markets. Our objective is to characterize the exchange rate in 
a general equilibrium setting without imposing strong restrictions on the model. In contrast to 
most of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) literature, where the relation between exchange 
rates and prices  is  derived rather informally,  we  show  under what alternative  sets  of 
assumptions the general equilibrium model reduces to PPP, and, especially, how exchange 
rates are determined when PPP does not hold. We also formulate and implement a new test of 
PPP against a specific alternative. 
In particular, we characterize the equilibrium exchange rate in a multi-country and multi-
commodity economy where there may be fixed and/or proportional costs for reallocating goods 
across countries, and where agents' utility functions need not be homothetic, or of the HARA 
class, or identical across countries.  On the theoretical level,  our main findings  are the 
following: 
(a)  In general, the nominal exchange rate mirrors differences in initial wealths and marginal 
indirect utilities of nominal spending. The effect of initial wealths is that,  by PPP 
standards, the currencies of richer countries tend to be overvalued. Necessary conditions 
for differences in marginal indirect utilities, on the other hand, are (a) commodity market 
imperfections and/or differences in consumption preferences, and (b),  perhaps less 
predictably, risk-aversion. 
(b)  The popular case of risk-neutrality and homothecy has rather exceptional implications. 
IStockman (1980), and, for instance, Lucas (1982), Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), Svensson (1985a,b), 
Hodrick and  Srivastava (1986),  Stulz (1987),  Stockman  and Dellas  (1989),  Dumas (1992), Engel 
(1992a,b), Bekaert (1992), Backus and Smith (1993), Sercu, Van Hulle, and Uppal (1995). 2 
First, under these assumptions relative PPP holds irrespective of commodity market 
imperfections and differences in consumption preferences. Second, initial wealth no 
longer affects the equilibrium if (and only it) the assumptions of perfect goods markets 
and identical preferences are added. 
(c)  In another special case-with homothetic, Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility 
functions-we obtain a  tractable and testable generalization of the  traditional PPP 
equation. Specifically, according to the CRRA model there are two missing variables in 
the PPP equation (the two countries' nominal spendings); moreover, the elasticities of the 
exchange rate with respect to the price indices need not be identical across countries, and 
their sign differs from what PPP predicts. 
(d)  In a (more realistic) model with non-homothetic preferences, the nominal exchange rate 
change depends not only on the standard ("average") inflation differential across countries 
(as in the PPP model) but also on the inflation differential computed on the basis of 
marginal consumption weights, growth in real spending, and the (generally time-varying) 
degree of risk aversion in the two countries. 
(e)  From items (b) and (d), we infer that standard regression or cointegration tests of PPP 
suffer from missing-variables biases  and ignore variations in risk aversions across 
countries and over time. In hyperinflation samples, relative PPP may seem to hold fairly 
well because the missing variables then behave quite similarly and because the elasticities 
of the exchange rate w.r.t. all variables sum to unity. 
We complement our theoretical analysis of the exchange rate with empirical test of the 
homothecy/CRRA version of the model, using the Johansen-Juselius co integration framework. 
We find, fIrst, that the outcome of the tests crucially depends on whether (and how) nominal 
spending is allowed enter into the short-term dynamics of the exchange rate: If nominal 
spending is entirely absent from the short-term dynamics, or when only real spending is 
included in the vector autoregessions (V ARs), we reject both PPP and the CRRA model. 
Second, when nominal spending is given an independent role (next to prices) in the short-term 
dynamics, both PPP and the CRRA model become acceptable. We argue that the failure to 3 
distinguish between the PPP and CRRA models is a logical implication of the latter model in 
sllillples where nominal spending and price data have similar time paths. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present a very general 
version of the Stockman (1980) equilibrium model. In Section II, we analyze deviations from 
Absolute PPP under homothetic utility-first in general, and then in the special cases of risk 
neutrality and constant relative risk aversion. We also discuss the implications of the CRRA 
model for cointegration tests of exchange rate models. In Section III, we test this special 
version of the model. As mentioned before, the results are ambiguous. In Section IV, we 
therefore return to theory. We derive a general model for changes in the exchange rate and we 
use this model to re-interpret regression tests of relative PPP and cointegration tests of the 
CRRA model. Section V concludes. A glossary summarizing the mathematical notation used in 
the paper is included at the end of Section V. 
I.  The  Economy  and the  Equilibrium  Exchange  Rate 
In  this section,  we  first describe a model of a multi-country, multi-good economy with 
imperfect commodity markets.  We impose  only  a few  (very  standard)  restrictions  on 
preferences, and none on  production or endowment processes and the degree or type of 
commodity market imperfections. In the second part of this section, we  characterize the 
exchange rate in this general setting. 
The economy that we consider consists of M ~  2 countries. We focus on two arbitrarily 
selected countries that are referred to  as the home country (subscript k = 1) and the foreign 
country (k = 2). Each country has a representative consumer with a standard, strictly quasi-
concave utility function defined over N  ~ 1 goods.  Across countries these representative 
individuals may differ in terms of risk-aversion, consumption preferences, and initial wealths. 
The outputs of each of the N goods can be stochastic over time. The economies could 
be exchange economies where output is determined by exogenous endowment processes (as in 4 
Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982)) or production economies with endogenous investment 
decisions (as in Dumas (1992) and Stulz (1987)).  The specification of the production or 
endowment processes is quite general: some goods may be produced everywhere, while other 
goods may be produced only in some countries. International shipment of these goods may be 
costly for some or even all of these goods; and the costs, if any, may involve fixed recurrent 
costs (as in Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989a, 1989b) and Krugman (1989)) and/or 
purely variable costs (as in Dumas (1992) and Sercu et al. (1995)), possibly with economies of 
scale. Given these costs for transferring goods across countries, some goods may be traded all 
the time, some may be tradable in the strict sense (that is, traded only if the price difference is 
sufficiently large to justify incurring the shipment costs), and some goods may be defacto non-
tradable.2 For simplicity, money is introduced into the model via the Lucas (1982) cash-in-
advance constraint  3 
We assume that financial markets are complete and perfect. Thus, the outcome of 
decentralized consumption and investment decisions is identical to  the solution of a central 
planner's problem of the form 
T  M  T 
MaxEt[J Ul{£I(S)) ds]  +  L  8kEt[S UkC£k(s)) ds]  (1.1) 
k=2  t 
This optimization is constrained by opportunity set that depends on the currently available 
outputs, the production functions, and the shipping technology. We do not need to specify the 
opportunity set explicitly. In (1.1),  ~(t) is the vector of consumption quantities CkjCt) of goodj 
(=1, ... , N) consumed by the representative individual in country k (=1, ... , M) and Uk is the 
utility function of the representative investor in country k. The relative weight assigned by the 
20ther frictions could be introduced, like shipment lags (goods sent from one country at time t arrive only 
at time t+l) and transaction lags (a trade arranged at time t is implemented at time t+l only). It can be 
shown that neither transaction lags nor shipment lags affect any of our conclusions. 
3Essentially the same results would be obtained if real money balances were introduced as an argument in 
the utility function, except that the price index will contain the interest cost of money balances-see, for 
instance, Stulz (1987). 5 
central planner to each of the other countries, Sk, generally is a function the initial distribution 
of wealth in the equivalent decentralized problem.4 In turn, these initial wealths depend on the 
initial endowments, the characteristics of the (stochastic) investment functions or endowment 
processes, the frictions in the international markets for consumption and capital goods, and the 
utility functions.5 For example, one sufficient (but not necessary) set of assumptions to obtain 
ak =  1 is when the utility functions, the initial endowments, and the parameters of the output 
process of all countries are identical. 
Given the above assumptions,  we now derive the exchange rate.  Define the net 
endowment of each good in each country as the amount available for consumption. In an 
exchange economy, the net endowments are, of course, identical to the gross endowments, 
while in a production economy we need to set aside the resources needed for the optimal 
investments identified from the solution of (1.1). If  (1.1) is maximized, it must be impossible to 
further increase the utility from current consumption in one country without reducing either 
consumption in another country or investments. Denote the aggregate utility from immediate 
consumption by (boldface) UO: 
M 
U(£(t))  ==  Ul(£l(t))  +  L Sk Uk(£k(t)) . 
k=2 
(1.2) 
Thus, in the optimum identified from (1.1),  U(£(t)) must be at its maximum subject to the 
feasible set implied by the net endowments and the transaction technology. From this Pareto-
optimality of consumption, it follows that the relative price for any pair of goods can be read 
off as the marginal rate of substitution (MRS), along U(£(t)), in the optimum. 
Let us chose, as the pair of goods, one unit of good j located in country 1 and one unit 
4In a decentralized economy with a complete capital market, there exists a portfolio strategy that allows 
investors to implement the central planner's solution. For example, consider the case where 9k = 1, utility 
functions are equal, and shipment costs are zero. The central planner's solution then is to give each of the M 
countries an equal amount of consumption. The portfolio strategy that implements this plan is that each 
country holds l/M-th of the shares of  each productive asset, so that each country can obtain l/M-th of world 
output. 
5When commodity preferences are not equal, 92 obviously depends also on the (arbitrarily chosen) size of 
the reference bundle in which each country's real wealth is expressed. 6 
of the same good j located in country 2. The local-currency prices of these goods are denoted 
by Plj(t) and P2j(t).  Because the relative price has to be computed from nominal prices 
expressed in a common numeraire, we need a reference numeraire and an exchange rate. 
Without loss of generality, we select currency 1 as the numeraire, and use the symbol Set) to 
denote the exchange rate (units of country-l currency per unit of  currency 2). Below, we write 
the condition that equates the relative price to the MRS: 
Set) P2j(t) 
Plj(t) 
=  aU(t)/aC2j(t) 
aU(t)/aClj(t)  (1.3) 
In Proposition 1, below, we now link the nominal exchange rate to the marginal indirect utility 
function. The indirect utility function, V(Mk(t), llk(t)), is defined as 
N 
V(Mk(t), l2k(t)) = Max  {Uk<£k(t)) - Ak(t) ['l: Ckj(t) Pkj{t) - Mk(t)]},  (1.4) 
CIci(t)  j=l 
where Mk(t) is the amount of nominal spending, expressed in units of currency k. The 
marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in country k is the multiplier, A(t), in the above 
optimization problem: 
The link between the exchange rate and the marginal indirect utilities is stated in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: The nominal exchange rate, S(t), is proportional to the ratio of  the marginal 
indirect utility of  total nominal spending in the tlvo countries: 
Set)  =  82  A2(t)  . 
AI(t) 
(1.5) 
Proof: Substitute (1.2) into (1.3) to relate the central planner's MRS to the marginal utilities of 
the two countries: 
Set) P2j(t)  _ 82 aU2(t)/aC2j(t) 
Plj(t)  - au  I  (t)/aClj(t) 
Then solve for the exchange rate: 7 
aU2(£2(t»  I aC2j(t) 
Set) = e  P2j(t) 
2 aUl(Q(t»/aClj(t) 
Plj{t) 
To obtain (1.5), we substitute aUk(t)/ackj(t) =  Ak(t) Pjk(t), which is the first-order condition 
obtained from the optimization problem defmed in (1.4) .• 
Proposition (1.1) is a familiar result in the Unbiased Expectations literature (see, for 
instance, Lewis (1995), for a review). We wish to study its implications for the real exchange 
rate and deviations from PPP. In Section II, the focus is on the level of the exchange rate. Most 
of this discussion is confined to the special case of homothetic utility functions. In this section 
we obtain a new sufficient condition for PPP, and a testable generalized equation that contains 
PPP as a special case. We test this model in Section III. In the non-homothetic preferences 
case, it is rarely possible to obtain a tractable characterization of the level of the exchange rate 
from (1.5); however, as shown in Section IV, an interesting general characterization of changes 
in exchange rates is always possible. 
II.  Characterizing  the  Level oj the  Exchange  Rate 
In this section, we consider the special case of homothetic preferences. We first discuss the 
general implications of homothecy for the exchange rate equation (1.5). We then consider two 
alternative special cases that both imply PPP, and we derive the CRRA exchange rate model of 
which PPP is a special case. Lastly, we discuss the implications of our theoretical results for 
empirical tests of PPP. 
II.A  Implications  of the  Assumption  of Homothetic  Utility  Functions 
By definition, a homothetic utility function can be written as Uk(Qc(t»  =  <l>[Uk(Qc(t»], where 
ukC£k(t»  is linear homogenous in the consumption quantities and where <l>k  is a positive 
transformation. The function ukC£k(t»  can be thought of as summarizing the consumption 
preferences (which are independent of wealth or total spending), while the curvature of the 8 
transformation, <I>(.),  reflects the degree of risk aversion. This separation of consumption 
preferences from risk aversion makes it possible to obtain simple statements about the level of 
the exchange rate in terms of the level of nominal spending, the level price and relative risk 
aversion.  6 
If  the function <I>[Uk(£k(t))]  is at its maximum value given a consumption budget 
constraint, then ukC9c(t)) must also be at its maximum value subject to the same constraint. It is 
well known (see, for instance, Samuelson and Swamy (1974)) that the solution of the linear-
homogenous problem, 
Vk(Mk(t),llk(t)) =  Max  {ukC9c(t)) - Ak(t) [L,Ckj(t) Pkj(t) - Mk(t)]} ,  (11.1) 
Ckj(t) 
is of the form Vk(t)  = Mk(t)/llk(Illc(t)). The function IIk(Illc(t)) is independent of nominal 
spending, Mk(t), and is linear homogenous in the prices. Accordingly, IIkCruc(t)) is interpreted 
as the price level, and Vk(t) =  Mk(t)/llkCruc(t)) is interpreted as real spending. These properties 
of  ho~othetic functions lead to the following result: 
Proposition 2: If utility functions are homothetic, the nominal exchange rate, S(t), and the 
real exchange rate, Z(t), are given by 
and 
Set) = 82  d<I>2(t)/dv2(t)  III(t)  , 
d<I>l(t)/dvI(t)  II2(t) 
Z(t) =  Set) 112(t)  = 82  d<I>2(t)/dv2(t) 
III  (t)  d<I>l (t)/dVl (t) 
(11.2) 
(11.3) 
Proof: Using the relations Vk[Mk(t), ruc(t)]  =  <I>k(Vk(t))  and Vk(t) = Mk(t)lIIk(t), we can 
6With non-homothetic utility, similar results can be obtained only in very special cases. One example of a 
tractable non-homothetic function is U(t) = mj~1 (cj{t) - ml~j  ]1-11, where risk aversion is a constant (11) 
and the optimal consumption pattern depends on total spending and prices in a very straightforward way. specify the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending as follows: 
aVk(Mk(t), l2k(t))  _  d<l>Ic(Vk(t))  avk(t) 
aMk(t)  - dVk(t)  aMk(t) 
d<l>k(V(t))  1 
=  dVk(t)  -rr-k(m:-(t-))  (11.4) 
Substituting (IrA) into (1.5) we obtain (II.2) and (II.3) .• 
Corollary 1 to Proposition 2: The real exchange rate for country k relative to  country 1 is 
the MRS of  that country's real spending, vit), relative to Vj(t). 
Proof: This result follows immediately from (I1.3) and UO = <l>I(VI(t)) + Lk~2  <l>k(Vk(t)). 
Corollary 2 to Proposition 2: If  there are transaction costs or if  consumption preferences 
9 
differ, then for given net endowments the currencies of  wealthier countries tend be overvalued 
by P  P  P standards. 
Proof: From Corollary 1, we need to show that, in the optimum, the MRS of V2(t) relative to 
v I (t)  tends to  be higher when 82 is higher.  The optimum is jointly determined by the 
indifference curves and the opportunity set. First consider the effect of initial wealths on the 
central planner's indifference curves. A higher initial wealth for country 2 generally implies a 
higher value for 82,7 which means that, in the (V2, VI) plane, the indifference curves are more 
to the right, reflecting the bias in favor of country-2 consumption. For instance, in Figure 1 the 
curve through V' corresponds to a higher value of 82 than is the case for the curve through V. 
Thus, for given endowments a higher initial wealth for country 2 will produce a higher MRS 
provided that the opportunity set is convex. We now show that the opportunity set is convex if 
(a) there are transaction costs or (b) consumption preferences differ across countries. 
(a) The graph on the left in  Figure 1 illustrates the case of one good and a proportional 
7The one exception is discussed in Proposition 3(c). 10 
transaction cost equal to 't, as in Dumas (1992). The bound on the consumption opportunity set 
is piece-wise linear:  its is  slope -(1  +'t) when country 2  is importing (that is,  when the 
consumption point V  =  (V2, VI)  is to the right and below the net endowment point Q = (q2, 
qI)), and its slope is -1/(1  +'t) when county 2 is exporting. Thus, the opportunity set is convex, 
and equilibria more to the right (like V' relative to V) correspond to higher a MRS and, 
therefore, a higher real exchange rate. 
(b) The graph on the right illustrates the case of many commodities, no frictions, and different 
consumption  preferences  Uk(£k(t)).  The problem of deriving  the  opportunity  set for 
international real spending, (VI, V2),  is isomorphic to the problem of deriving a country's 
production opportunity set in the Heckscher-Ohlin model: the role of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
linear homogenous production functions with different factor intensities is taken over by the 
linear homogenous preference functions Uk© with different consumption preferences; and the 
role of the factor endowments is taken over by the aggregate endowments, qj =  qlj + q2j, for 
each of the goods. Thus, with different consumption preferences the opportunity set is strictly 
convex.  Therefore, the solution for a higher value of 82, V', again results in a higher MRS 
than the solution for lower 82, V .• 
The second corollary fits in with the stylized fact that currencies of richer countries tend 
to have higher real values. Thus, the effect of relative wealth (via 82) complements the Balassa 
(1964)-Samuelson (1964) productivity-based explanation of the same empirical regularity. 
II.B.  Purchasing  Power  Parity 
Much of the theory of exchange rates is based on PPP. In this section we discuss PPP as a 
special case of (11.2)-(II.3). In the next section we then derive a more general theory of the 
exchange rate that will provide the alternative hypothesis to PPP in our empirical tests. 
The general model of the exchange rate in the case of homothetic preferences, (11.2)-
(11.3),  simplifies to relative PPP if the ratio of the marginal utilities of real spending is a 
constant. This will be the case under the  alternative assumptions  (a)  and (b)  listed in 11 
Proposition 3, below. Case (a) in the proposition corresponds to the standard (commodity-
market based)  set of assumptions for PPP.  Case (b),  being purely utility-based, is less 
familiar. Case (c)-the intersection of (a) and (b)-deserves special attention because this 
represents the sole case where relative wealths are not a determinant of the exchange rate. 
Proposition  3. 
(a)  If commodity markets are frictionless and agents have identical,  homothetic utility 
functions, then Absolute PPP holds. 
(b)  If agents have linear homogenous utility functions,  the real exchange rate equals a 
constant,  82,-that is, Relative PPP holds-irrespectively of  market imperfections and 
differences in consumption preferences. 
(c)  (h  is  independent of the  initial wealths if and only if agents have identical linear 
homogenous utility functions and markets are perfect. Then 82 =  1. 
Proof: To derive Proposition 3(a) from (11.3), note that under the assumptions of frictionless 
markets and identical homothetic utility functions, the relative consumption bundles will be 
identical across countries. That is, at any time t there is but one composite good in the world 
(with time-varying composition proportional to the aggregate consumption amounts of the 
individual goods). It follows that at any moment the central planner's opportunity set in the 
(V2, VI) plane is bounded by a minus 4S-degree line. Thus, if the optimum is an interior one, 
the MRS in that optimum always equals unity. 
The proof of Proposition 3(b) immediately follows upon specifying <l>k(Vk(t)) =  Vk(t) in 
(II.2):8 
(risk-neutral model:)  (II.S) 
To reconcile the if-part of Proposition 3(c) with Proposition 3(b), we need to show that 
8This ignores possible constants (like <I>k(Vk(t)) = ak Vk(t)); such constants are assumed to be part of Ok. 
See also footnote 5. 12 
82 must be equal to unity when preferences are identical and frictions are absent. This can be 
shown by  contradiction.9 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3(c), the central planner's 
opportunity set is again bounded by a minus 45-degree line. However, with risk neutrality-
that is, Vet) = vIet) + 82 v2(t)}-the central planner's indifference curves degenerate to straight 
lines with slope -62. This geometry immediately means that, if  82 were different from unity, 
there would always be a corner solution: one country would never consume anything, which is 
incompatible with the existence of two countries. To see why the irrelevance of initial wealths 
for the determination of exchange rates holds only under the highly stylized assumptions in part 
(c) of Proposition 3, just note that when there are transaction costs or when preferences differ 
across countries, the opportunity set is no longer linear (see Figure 1), while the indifference 
curves become non-linear when there is risk aversion. Either is sufficient to produce an interior 
solution. Thus, any value of 82 then implies a well-defined sharing rule for consumption and, 
therefore, corresponds to a specific division of initial wealth. • 
We finish this section with two comments on Proposition 3. Our first comment relates 
to the perhaps puzzling indeterminacy of the central planner's consumption allocation problem 
in the case discussed in Proposition 3(c). Mathematically, this indeterminacy stems from the 
result that, under the assumptions in Proposition 3(c), all indifference curves must be minus 
45-degree lines and, therefore, parallel to the budget line. To better understand the economics 
behind this indeterminacy, consider the portfolio decisions in the underlying decentralized 
economy. While, with identical preferences and perfect markets, consumption decisions are 
similar across countries, the portfolios held by the (risk-neutral) representative agents will 
differ unpredictably across countries. This is because, in equilibrium, all assets provide the 
same expected real return, which then implies that all fully invested portfolios are equally 
9  An alternative line of proof is as follows. Assume that there is one (composite) good, no friction, and that 
cI>k(Vk(t»  = Vk(t)1-11  where 11  (:t:O)  is relative risk aversion. It follows easily that the consumption ratio, 
V2(t)!v1 (t), will be constant and equal to 921/11. As a result, the ratio of initial wealths, W2(0)fW  1  (0), must 
be 921/11, too. This then means that 92 equals [W2(0)1W1(0)]11,  which converges towards unity as  11 
approaches zero. 13 
acceptable to a risk-neutral investor. Because of the indetenninacy of the portfolios chosen in 
the past, very little can be said about the allocation of consumption across countries at any 
given point in time. All we know is that the dividends will finance a consumption plan that 
clears the commodity markets. To reflect this indeterminacy, the central planner's indifference 
curves U(Vl(t), V2(t))  must rank all market-clearing consumption patterns (Vl(t), V2(t))  as 
equally desirable, regardless of the initial wealths. This means that the slope of the indifference 
curve, 82, is equal to (minus) unity everywhere. 
Second, note that Proposition 3 allows us to clear up some confusion that exists about 
the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (UEH) and the Siegel Paradox. Specifically, the Siegel 
Paradox seems to suggest that no equilibrium can be obtained in a risk-neutral world unless the 
exchange rate is non-random.lO To resolve the issue, we note first that risk-neutrality ought to 
be defined in real terms, not in nominal terms (as the UEH does). Stated differently, the UEH 
implicitly assumes that inflation is deterministic. But Proposition 3(b) tells us that, if inflation 
is known,  the  future  spot  rate  automatically  becomes  non-random.  Thus,  under  the 
assumptions of the UEH-risk-neutrality and no inflation risk-the Siegel Paradox does not 
arise, and there is no problem with obtaining equilibrium. 
One lesson from Proposition 3 is that, within the logic of standard micro-economics, 
variations in the real exchange rate are prima jacie evidence of risk aversion when, at least, 
consumption preferences are homothetic. We shall address the implications of non-homothetic 
preferences in Section IV.  Before that, we derive a testable equation for the level of the 
exchange rate in the homothetic/CRRA case, and present some empirical results. 
lODenote the forward rate, set at time t for delivery at time Hn, by F(t, Hn), and denote a conditional 
expectation about the future spot rate by Et(S(Hn». The Siegel paradox is that, when exchange rates are 
uncertain, the UEH from country l's point of view is incompatible with the UEH from country 2's point 
of view: F(t,t+  1) = Et(S(t+n» precludes IIF(t,t+  1) = Et(l/S(t+n»  unless S(t+n) is non-random. 14 
II.e  Models  with  Constant  Relative  Risk Aversion 
Backus and Smith (1993), Dumas (1992), Stulz (1987), and Sercu et al.  (1995) discuss 
models of the real exchange rate with one or two goods (whereof at least one good is tradable 
at a cost), and constant relative risk aversion. These models are special cases of the general, 
homothetic-utility model (II.2). To see this, we first consider the case where relative risk 
aversion is constant and not equal to unity; that is, we specify (II.2) for <l>Ic(Vk(t)) = Vk(t)1-11k, 
where 11k is the Pratt-Arrow measure of relative risk aversion. With this definition of  <l>Ic(Vk(t)), 
we obtain: 
(CRRA model:)  S(t) =  82  1 -112  V2(trTl2  lll(t) 
1 - 111  v l(tr Tl 1 ll2(t) 
1 -112  M1(t)Tll  lll(t)1-Tl1 
=  82 
1 - 111  M2(t)Tl2  ll2(t)1-Tl2 
(11.6) 
The last line follows after substituting Vk(t) = Mk(t)!llk(t). In the log-utility case (11=1), (1.5) 
immediately leads to 
M1(t) 
(Log-utility model:)  S(t) = 82  M2(t)  (11.7) 
Assuming two countries and identical relative risk aversions across countries, Sercu et 
al. (1995) derive (I1.6) and (I1.7) for the special case of one (imperfectly tradable) good, while 
Backus and Smith (1993) derive (II.6) for the case of CES consumption preferences defined 
over one perfectly tradable good and one non-tradable good. Stulz (1987) derives (II.7) from a 
two-country production economy with log investors that have identical,  Cobb-Douglas 
preferences defined over a perfectly tradable good and a non-traded good)1 Thus, we see that 
these special versions are easily generalized to cases where there are N goods (regardless of 
their degree of tradability) and M countries, and where the degrees of relative risk aversion and 
the commodity preferences differ across countries. 
l1Stulz' exchange rate equation also contains interest rate terms. This is because he uses a money-in-the-
utility-function approach rather than a cash-in-advance approach. 15 
From Proposition 3(a), equations (IL6)-(II.7) collapse to Absolute PPP in the special 
case of identical consumption preferences and perfect commodity markets. Thus, unli..1.;:e 
standard PPP theory, the CRRA model offers a specific equilibrium value for the exchange rate 
when there are frictions in the commodity markets or when consumption preferences differ. To 
characterize this equilibrium one needs just two additional (observable) variables, the nominal 
spendings. This means that we now have a specific alternative when we test for PPP. An 
additional advantage of the CRRA model is that it  can be linearized by taking logs. Given the 
well-documented non-stationarity of the right-hand-side variables,  this  log-linearity  of 
equations (II.6)-(II.7) also allows us to  use a cointegration framework rather than the less 
powerful techniques that rely on differencing the data. In the next section we discuss how one 
can test the alternative models (PPP v. CRRA). 
II.D  Testable  Distinctions  between  the  PPP and  CRRA  Models  of  the 
Exchange  Rate 
In Sections ILB and II.C, both the CRRA and PPP models have been derived as exact 
relations. In practice, no proponent of PPP would reject that theory just because it does not 
hold perfectly at all times. Instead, the hypothesis is said to hold "in the long run". Once one 
admits deviations in the short run, the term "long-run PPP" obviously cannot mean that there 
are no deviations over long horizons; instead, "long-run PPP" can only mean that the ex ante 
variance of future deviations goes up less than proportionally with the time horizon. Or, more 
precisely, "long-run PPP" is commonly equated with stationarity of the real exchange rate. 
Tests of long-run PPP (in the above sense of the term) include time series analysis of 
real exchange rates and co  integration tests. The empirical evidence is mixed. Autocorrelation 
tests often cannot reject the hypothesis of a non-stationary real exchange rate (see, for instance, 
Adler and Lehman (1983)). However, the more powerful augmented Dickey-Fuller test does 
reveal mean reversion in real exchange rates (Abuaf and Jorion (1991)). Cointegration tests, on 
the other hand, tend to strongly reject PPP (see, for instance, Nessen (1994) and the references 
therein). 16 
In light of our theoretical analysis, we offer the following comments on these tests of 
PPP. First, the presence of mean-reversion in the real exchange rate does not allow us to 
distinguish between the PPP and CRRA models because the real exchange rate implied by 
(II.6)-(II.7) is likely to be stationary, too. To see this, re-cast model (II.6) in real tenns: 
(11.9) 
It  is quite likely that the real spending ratio on the right-hand side of (II.9) has finite variance. 
For instance, when all  goods are tradable at a positive but finite cost and consumption 
preferences are identical across countries, then the relative real spending ratio in (ll.9) is clearly 
bounded. Differences in spending patterns may lead to deviations from Relative PPP if, within 
each country, relative prices change over time. However, when productive resources can be 
redeployed across sectors, one would not expect relative prices to wander off to infinity or 
zero, within a country. Thus, relative price effects are not likely to imply martingale-behavior 
in the exchange rate either. 
In light of the probable boundedness of the consumption ratio, stationarity of the real 
exchange rate is not a good criterion if the purpose is to distinguish between the PPP and 
CRRA models. Rather, the appropriate question is whether deviations from PPP are correlated 
with real spending data, with the direction of the correlation being consistent with our prior that 
11k is positive (and, following the consensus, larger than unity).12 Alternatively, the question to 
be answered is whether, after controlling for nominal spending, the nominal exchange rate 
depredates when domestic prices rise faster than foreign prices, rather than the inverse (as PPP 
predicts). This type of question can only be answered by a co  integration analysis, not by a 
univariate time series investigation of real exchange rates. 
12Following Lucas (1982), many have tested the CRRA model in the special case of equal 11's.  From 
equation (11.5), we see that there is no need to impose this restriction. For example, in a plot of means or 
standard deviations of log real rates against means or standard deviations of log ratios of real spending 
ratios, Backus and Smith (1993) find no linear pattern. Such a rmding, being consistent with differences in 
11's across countries, is not evidence against the general CRRA model, and a fortiori not against the 
equilibrium approach to the exchange rate. 17 
This then brings us to our second comment on empirical tests on PPP. True to  their 
main purpose, standard cointegration tests have focused exclusively on the long-term relation 
between exchange rates and prices, and have simply taken for granted that no other variables 
are relevant in the V  ARs-the first stage of a cointegration analysis-or in the short-run 
dynamics in the final equation. (A brief review of the role of V  ARs and short-term dynamics is 
provided in the Appendix.) Yet, PPP can also be obtained by setting 11k = 0 in the CRRA 
model, (ll.6); and this CRRA model predicts a long-run relationship between not just exchange 
rates and prices but also nominal spendings: 
10gS(t) =  log 82 -- + 11110gMl(t) -11210gM2(t)) + (1-111) 10gIll(t) - (1-112) logIl2(t) .  (  1-T11) 
1-112 
(11.10) 
In estimating (11.10) in its general form (without a priori restricting the 11's to be zero), both 
nominal spendings  and prices are  allowed to  play independent roles in the short-term 
dynamics. Thus, when testing for PPP as a special case of (11.10), the first-pass VARs and the 
short-term fluctuations are not the same as in the standard cointegration test of PPP (where 
spending is not allowed to play any role). We provide evidence, in the next section, that such 
differences in the modeling do affect the conclusions regarding PPP. As a theory of exchange 
rates, PPP of course cannot answer the question which variables should enter the short-term 
model, because PPP is utterly agnostic about what variables explain movements of the real rate 
within the leeway provided by market imperfections or differences in consumption preferences. 
Note that a similar V  AR-modeling decision has to be made when the CRRA model is to 
be analyzed. Again, theory has no suggestions about what explains short-term deviations from 
the equilibrium because theory derives (H.9)-(1I.1O)  as  an  exact relation. The pragmatic 
solution again is to assume that the short-term fluctuations are driven only by the variables 
entering the long-term cointegration relation. But even within this assumption two approaches 
remain possible. First, one could work with (H.lO), which lists five nominal variables; then 
the assumption is that the nominal prices and spendings are allowed to independently affect the 
short-run fluctuations of the exchange rate. Alternatively, one could re-cast (11.10) into real 
terms, as follows: 18 
(11.11) 
In estimating the co  integration vector(s) between the real exchange rate and the real spending 
variables in (11.11), one then assumes that also for the first-pass VARs and the short-run 
dynamics the real consumption data suffice; that is, unlike in tests of model (11.10) one now 
constrains the coefficients of logMj(t) and logIIj(t) to be the same (up to the sign) in the long-
run cointegration relationship, and likewise in the short-run fluctuations. Again, it is not a 
priori obvious which way of specifying the V  ARs and the short-run dynamics is the correct 
one. 
To summarize: univariate tests of stationarity of the real exchange rate do not allow us 
to distinguish between the PPP and CRRA models of the exchange rate. As to cointegration 
tests, we can test the following hypotheses: 
•  Hypothesis PPP(1)-the standard cointegration test of PPP: the data are compatible with 
the hypothesis 11k  = 0 for all countries k,  and the short-term dynamics involve only 
inflation rates. 
•  Hypothesis PPP(2): the data are compatible with the hypothesis 11k =  0 for all countries k, 
and the short-term dynamics involve both inflation rates and changes in nominal spending. 
•  Hypothesis PPP(3): in the long run, the real exchange rate is unrelated to real spending 
data, and the short-term dynamics involve only changes in real spending. 
•  Hypothesis CRRA(I): the data are compatible with the hypothesis 11k > 0 for all countries 
k,  and the  short-term dynamics involve both inflation rates and changes in  nominal 
spending. 
•  Hypothesis CRRA(2): the data are compatible with the hypothesis 11k > 0 for all countries 
k, and the short-term dynamics involve only changes in real spending. 
Note, lastly, that the power of such cointegration tests may be low.  Assume, for 
instance, that the CRRA model is true, and that one tests Hypothesis PPP(I), which omits the 19 
nominal spending variables. One could still obselVe a PPP-like relation between the exchange 
rate and the domestic and foreign price level if each of the omitted nominal-spending vfu'iables 
is highly positively correlated with the price level of the corresponding country. For instance, 
under hyperinflation circumstances, the log of a country's nominal spending closely tracks the 
log of that country's price level; thus, under those circumstances the estimated coefficient for 
the price level can be expected to be close to unity because this coefficient is likely to add (most 
of) the effect of nominal spending, 11k, to the ceteris paribus effect of the price level, which 
equals I-11k. This argument also implies that, when the CRRA model holds and the sample 
paths of prices and nominal spendings are  sufficiently similar,  it can be quite hard to 
distinguish between Hypothesis PPP(2) and Hypothesis CRRA(l). 
III  Empirical  Tests  of the  Model  with  Homothetic  Utility  and 
Constant  Relative  Risk  Aversion 
We test the CRRA model (in its log form,  equations (II.1O)-(II.ll)) using cointegration 
analysis. The original Engle-Granger cointegration approach adopts a bivariate framework, 
while the more recent and more powerful approach developed by Johansen uses a multivariate 
framework that allows for the existence of multiple cointegrating vectors and a  richer 
specification of short-run dynamics. We have used the latter approach, and in particular the 
type of tests described in Johansen and Juselius (1992), to implement the empirical tests of the 
PPP and CRRA models. 
III.  A.  Data,  Model  Setup,  and Estimation  Procedure 
One problem with (II.1O)-(II.11) is that, for many countries, real consumption data are not 
available in high-frequency form.  As the VAR procedure used in cointegration analysis 
requires a large number of obselVations, we introduce another restriction: nominal spending is 
assumed to be cointegrated with the money supply. One case where this is trivially true is the 
cash-in-advance world, where a country's nominal spending simply equals the country's 
money supply. Consumer price indices being available on a monthly basis, the substitution of 20 
money supplies for nominal consumption data allows us to use monthly data. 
Thus, our main purpose is to  test (a)  whether there exists a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between nominal exchange rate, price levels and money supplies, and (b) whether 
such a relationship, if any, is of the form specified in equation (II. 10)-(11. 11) with acceptable 
positive values of the risk aversion parameters 111  and 112.  We will contrast this test of the 
CRRA model against the classical PPP alternative, the special case of (ILl  0)-(11.11) with zero 
risk aversions. 
We have selected six countries. The US  serves as the reference country. Germany 
(GE), the United Kingdom (UK) and Japan (JP) are chosen so as to represent the most heavily 
traded currencies. Lastly, we added two smaller European countries with an exchange rate that 
moved sufficiently independent from the DEM, no exchange controls during the post-Bretton-
Woods era, and no missing data in the International Financial Statistics tape published by the 
IMF: Belgium (BE) and Switzerland (SW). The data set consists of seventeen series of 
monthly data on nominal exchange rates of these five countries' currencies against the US 
dollar, the consumer price indices (CPIs) of the six countries, and their nominal money stocks 
(Mo; M3 for the UK). The sample period is from January 1973 to December 1992. 
The data are arranged into matrices that depend on which model is being tested. 
Denoting logs of Sk, Mk, and 11k by Sk, mk, and Pk, respectively, and denoting the log real 
exchange rates and money supplies by an sk and Ink, the data matrices are: 
• for Hypothesis PPP(l): the 11-variable system 
• for Hypotheses PPP(2) and CRRA(l): the 17-variable system 
• for Hypotheses PPP(3) and CRRA(2): the II-variable system 
[ *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *]  SBE,  ssw, scm, scm,  SIP, mBE, msw, IllGE, IllGB, mIP, mus  . 21 
For each data set we fIrst test how many long-run relationships seem to be present. The 
CRRA(1)-(2) and PPP(1)-(2) hypotheses predict that there should be at least five of these 
cointegrating vectors;  but given the nature of the underlying variables and the degree of 
interdependence (and possibly policy co-ordination) among the countries in the sample, the 
existence of a larger number of co integration relations is quite likely. To estimate the number of 
cointegrating relationships we use the maximum eigenvalue <LmaJ and the trace statistics.13 
Having established that there are at least five long-run relationships, we then verify the 
statistical acceptability of the PPP(1) hypothesis in the fIrst ll-variable data set. This test is 
first done one country at the time, and then for all countries simultaneously. The country-by-
country test works as follows. In the fIrst ll-series system (the test of Hypothesis PPP(1)), 
for instance, the hypothesis is that, for Belgium, the coefficients for sBE, 1tBE and 1tus are 1,-
1, and 1, respectively. To test the acceptability of Hypothesis PPP(I) for Belgium, we verify 
whether the llxl matrix ~ppp  = [1 0000 -10000 1]' is compatible with the data, imposing 
no restrictions on the remaining cointegrating vectors. Such country-by-country tests are done 
for each of the other countries. The second test is whether the hypothesis is acceptable for all 
fIve countries simultaneously. In this test, fIve cointegrating vectors are specifIed to conform to 
the PPP-hypothesis, while the remaining vectors are left unrestricted. The test statistic is a 
likelihood ratio. 
Tests  of the  PPP(2)  and  CRRA(1)  hypotheses  (in  the  17-variable  system)  are 
analogous: we test for the presence of a specific cointegrating relation as suggested by (II. 10). 
In a test of a PPP hypothesis as reported above, the choice of coefficients for Sk, Pk and Pus-
[l,-I,I]-is dictated by theory. Under the CRRA hypotheses, however, any positive value of 
13Lmax = -T log(1-Lr+l) and TR = -T Li=~+l log(1-Li), where T is the sample size, p the number of 
variables, and Li is the i-th ordered eigenvalue.  The Lmax statistic tests the hypothesis that there are r (::;; 
p--l) cointegration relations against the alternative that there are r+ 1 such relations. The trace statistic tests 
the hypothesis that there are r « p) cointegration relations against the alternative that there are p such 
relations. The tests often yield different conclusions. Osterwald-Lenum (1992) provides critical values for p 
=  11  variables, so that (p--r) can go from 0 (r=11) to 11  (r=0). Because these tests are known to have low 
power, Johansen and Juselius (1992) recommend using 90% critical values rather than the usual 95%. 22 
'Tlus and 'Tlk is pennissible. Consequently, the number of theoretically acceptable cointegration 
vectors is infinitely large. We report the tests for some illustrative values for these parameters, 
first  imposing  the  restriction  one  country  at  a  time,  and  then  for  all  five  countries 
simultaneously. For instance, to  test the hypothesis for Deutsche Mark we test whether the 
following vector is acceptable: 
[0,0, 1,0, 0,0,0, -(1-'TlGE), 0,0, (1-'Tlus), 0, 0, -'TlGE, 0, 0, 'Tlus]  , 
inserting the preselected values for 'TlGE and 'Tlus. 
III.B. Empirical  Results  and  Tests  of Hypotheses 
We first verify the presence of unit roots in the time series of Set), II(t) and M(t). Table 1, 
below, presents the results of applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) t-test with a data 
generating process that allows for both constant and a trend. There is a unit root present in all 
the data series, except for the Swiss and US  money supply series which may be stationary 
(apart from the time trend). Tests for the presence of more than one unit root were also 
performed but failed to reveal the presence of another unit root in any of the variables included 
in the system. The cointegration procedure itself was implemented with CATS in RA  TS.14 The 
lag length in the first set of auxiliary regressions was increased until the Box-Ljung statistic for 
serial correlation among residuals was insignificant at 5% level for all the equations. The final 
value of k was 10. 
To  test Hypothesis PPP(1),  we  estimate the cointegration relations  in  a  system 
consisting of five nominal exchange rates and six price levels. This is the usual set-up for tests 
of bilateral PPP in a multivariate cointegration framework. Table 2 presents the results for the 
number of cointegrating relationships in the data. At the 10% level of significance, both the 
Lmax  and trace tests indicate the presence of nine cointegrating relations among the eleven 
variables. This is consistent with PPP,  which predicts that there should be at least five 
14Hansen, H.  and K. Juselius(1995): CATS in RATS Cointegration Analysis of Time  Series 23 
cointegration relations in the data set. 
Table 3 presents the results of the likelihood ratio tests for the PPP(l) hypothesis. Our 
results confirm the findings of Nessen (1994) and others: in the exchange rate/prices system 
the hypothesis of stationarity of real exchange rates is rejected for all currencies, whether we 
test for all five countries individually or simultaneously. The only exception is the country-by-
country test for Belgium, where the hypothesis of a stationary real rate vis-a.-vis  the US 
receives weak support from the data. 
We next analyze the 17-variable system with five nominal exchange rates, six price 
levels and six money stocks. Again, the first step is to estimate the number of cointegrating 
relationships. The exchange rate model implies that there should be at least five of these 
relations among the six countries. Table 4 presents the trace and maximal eigenvalue statistics 
that test for the number of cointegrating vectors. From the table it is clear that the data reveal 
sixteen cointegrating relations among the seventeen variables. 
In this 17 -variable system we now test the hypothesis CRRA(  1) and PPP(2); that is, we 
test for the presence of a specific cointegrating relation for each currency involving (only) the 
following variables: that currency's nominal exchange rate, the price level and money stock of 
the country and price level and money stock of the reference country (the US). As argued 
before, the number of theoretically acceptable values of l1us, l1BE, l1sw, l1uK, l1GE, and l1JP is 
infinite, so that we can only show some representative cases. Table 5 presents the results for 
four different combinations of l1-values:  (l1us,l1non-US)  = (1.25, 1.50), (0.6, 0.4), (0.05, 
0.05), and (0, 0). The (0, 0) combination is the test of the PPP(2) hypothesis, which differs 
from the first PPP-test in that we now allow money supplies to playa role in the short-term 
dynamics. 
From Table 5 we see that each of the proposed cointegration vectors is still rejected 
when imposed for all countries simultaneously. However, and unlike what we found in the 24 
tests of Hypothesis PPP(l), each of these hypotheses now becomes acceptable when tested 
one country at the time-with the single exception for Switzerland in the case (l1us, 112) = 
(1.25, 1.50). The conclusion is twofold. First, money supplies seem to playa role in the short 
term dynamics process. Second, when allowing for this role of money supplies, it becomes 
difficult to reject any low value for relative risk-aversion (including, disappointingly, zero risk 
aversion). Apparently, the money supply and price data are too similar, which causes problems 
if, as the model suggests, the corresponding coefficients, 11k and I-11k, sum to unity. 15 
As discussed before, equation (II. 10) can also be interpreted as an equilibrium relation 
between the bilateral real exchange rate of currency i versus the reference currency and the 
corresponding real money stocks, equation (II. I I ). To test the validity of such a relation we 
now estimate a multivariate system with five real exchange rates and six real money stocks, and 
we test for the presence of cointegration vectors involving log(SiITi/IIus), 10g(Miilli) and 
10g(MuslIlus). This test has the advantage of restricting, a priori, the coefficients of 10g(Mi) 
and 10g(IIi) to sum to unity, and, thus, to steer clear of the multicollinearity between the two 
series. The disadvantage is that, now, nominal money stocks and price levels are no longer 
allowed to play an independent role in the short-term dynamics either; that is, the short-run 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate are assumed to be driven by real money supplies only. 
Table 6 provides the results of tests for the number of cointegrating vectors in this 11-
variable system. The CRRA(2) model says that there should be at least five cointegrating 
relationships in the real data. In contrast, the PPP(3) hypothesis implies that there should be at 
most nine. This is because, in  the PPP view (as distinct from CRRA) the real rate is  not 
related, in the long run, to real spending variables, which then implies that all cointegrating 
relationships  must  be  either  among  the  real  exchange  rates  themselves-up  to  four 
cointegration relationships-or among the real spending variables-up to five cointegration 
relationships. The Lmax test indicates presence of seven cOintegrating vectors while the trace 
15 Also Mark (1985), who tests the relationship between interest rates and marginal rates of substitution, 
obtains very imprecise estimates of 11  and cannot reject the hypothesis that 11  = o. 25 
test suggests eight. In the further tests of the CRRA(2) hypothesis we have proceeded on the 
assumption that there are seven cointegrating relations. 
As before, we have tested the acceptability of a large number of specific cointegration 
vectors corresponding to selected values for the risk aversion parameters. Some representative 
results are shown in Table 7. Each of the proposed vectors in Table 7 is now rejected, with the 
possible exception of the vector (llus =  3, llBE =  2) for the Belgian Franc. To confirm the 
generality of this negative conclusion we add, in the last panel of Table 7, a test where we do 
not specify any numerical values for the parameters lli and llus; that is, we only wish to test 
whether there is a cointegrating relationship that involves log(SiIIilITuS), log(MilITi) and 
log(MuslITus), and only these variables. This restriction is rejected in all cases except, very 
marginally, for the Belgian franc. 
We summarize our empirical findings as follows.  First, nominal money stocks and 
prices do seem to play separate roles in the short-term dynamics: the data reject all models 
where only real money supplies are allowed to playa role in the short-run fluctuations or where 
nominal money is not allowed to play any role in them. Second, when money supplies and 
prices are allowed to playa separate role in the short-term dynamics, equation (11.10)  is 
acceptable when tested one country at the time, as long as the proposed degree of risk aversion 
is low or even zero. This finding is consistent with the combined hypothesis that the CRRA 
model holds and that money and price data follow similar time paths. Indeed, the CRRA model 
predicts that the coefficients for the price and money supply variables sum to unity; so when 
these series behave rather similarly over time, it is difficult to distinguish between the roles of 
the two variables. 
Still, the evidence in favor of the CRRA model is far from conclusive. One possible 
reason for the less than satisfactory results may be the model's assumptions of homothetic 
preferences and constant risk aversion. In the following section, we therefore return to the 
general model  (1.5)  and  see what can be said about (changes  in)  exchange rates when 
preferences are not assumed to be homothetic and risk-aversion not constant. 26 
IV.  Characterizing  Changes  zn  the  Exchange  Rate 
From (1.5), it follows that percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate reflect percentage 
changes in the marginal utilities of spending:16 
(IV. 1) 
As in, for instance, Barten (1964) or Breeden (1978), we now apply a Slutsky decomposition 
of the changes in the marginal indirect utilities. That is, we decompose dAlA into the effect of 
the curvature of the indirect utility (the degree of relative risk aversion) and the effects of 
changes in each of the arguments of the indirect utility. As a result, the change in the nominal 
exchange rate is given by the sum of two terms:  one, the international differences in real 
consumption growth rates weighted by each country's relative risk aversion, and two, the 
international difference in the marginal inflation rates: 




dilk  = I [Ck~lkjJ  dp~i is inJ1ation weighted on the basis of  average consumption, 
ilk  j=l  k  PkJ 
16(IV.l) is  a first-order approximation. A (second-order)  Ito expansion shows that,  in a  model with 
continuous time ~d  continuous but stochastic output processes, there will be a drift added to the right hand 
side of {lV.I) that depends on the risk aversions and the (co)variances of the nominal spendings, the 
marginal inflation rates, and the total inflation rates. 
17This definition of relative risk aversion, also adopted by Breeden (1978), is a 'real' measure of relative risk 
aversion because, when taking partial derivatives w.r.t. mk(t), we hold constant the prices. In the one-good 
case, for instance, this definition is identical to the standard defmition, -Ck [a2uIJdck2]/[aUIJdck]. 27 
=  ~  [~~j Pkj] dp~j is inflation weighted on the basis of  marginal consumption.18 
j=l  k  Pk] 
Proof: We start from the total differential of Ak =  Ak(Mk,.ruc), substitute the definition Ak = 
aVk(Mk, .ruc)/aMk, invoke Roy's Identity-{)Vk/aPkj = - Ckj aVklaM}(-, and use the rule for 
differentiating a product. Finally, we bring out the percentage changes in the budget and the 
prices, and rearrange: 
(IV.3) 
Substitution of (lV.3) into (lV.I) then immediately produces (lV.2) .• 
To detect the importance of non-homothecy and time-varying risk aversion for the 
purpose of describing short-run changes of exchange rates, we can compare Equation (IV.2) to 
the log-change version of the homothecy/CRRA Model, 
18The marginal weights, [dckjldmkl Pkj, sum to  unity by virtue of the budget constraint. We denote the 
two inflation rates by drqJ1tk and dilk/ITk for consistency with the notation in the previous section, but we 
do not want to imply that the integrated counterparts 1tk and ilk always have known closed-form solutions. 28 
(IVA) 
Thus, locally, the non-constancy of relative risk aversion has no first-order effects, but non-
homothecy has. Specifically, the marginal and total inflation rates no longer coincide, and the 
term (i-11k) dIIk/Ilk in  (IVA) needs to  be replaced by d1tk/1tk -11k dIIk/Ilk. A related 
implication of (IV.2) is that risk-neutrality is not sufficient to  obtain PPP (Proposition 3). 
Specifically, when 11=0,  the exchange rate change generally equals the marginal inflation 
differential; and only in the homothecy case will marginal inflation coincide with average 
inflation. 
Equation (IV.2) also explains the poor results of regression tests of Relative PPP. To 
see this, first consider the special case where preferences are homothetic and relative risk 
aversion is equal and constant. Under these conditions, (lV.2) simplifies to: 
dS  =  11  (dMl _ dM2) + (1 -11) (dIll _ dIl2) 
S  MI  M2  \. III  Il2 
(IV.5) 
The implications of (IV.5) for tests of relative PPP are similar to the inferences made in Sercu 
et al.  (1995) in their one-good model. An increase in domestic inflation should lead to  an 
appreciation of the home currency (a decrease in S), as long as  we control for nominal 
spending. In light of this, the puzzle in standard regression tests of relative PPP is not why we 
do not observe exchange rates that are equal, on average, to inflation differences. Rather, given 
that 11  is commonly accepted to  be larger than unity, the puzzle is why we often observe a 
positive association between the two at all. The reason may be that, in the standard regression 
tests of relative PPP, the nominal spending variables are omitted. Given that growth rates of 
nominal spending are positively correlated with inflation rates, the true (negative) effect, 1 -11, 
of inflation is to some extent confounded with the positive effect, 11, of the omitted spending 
variable. As a result, the empirical estimates of the regression slope of MnS on Mn(III/Ih) are 
biased towards unity. As Sercu et al. (1995) argue, this is especially true in low-frequency data 
and in samples drawn from periods of hyperinflation where the correlation between growth in 
nominal spending and inflation is likely to  be stronger than otherwise. This conclusion also 29 
holds if  11  differs across countries. 
Equation (IV.2) also provides some insights about regression tests of relative PPP that 
cannot be obtained from (IV.S).  One, in the (realistic) case where preferences are non-
homothetic, there is an additional omitted variable, marginal inflation, which is imperfectly 
proxied for by the CPI measure of inflation. Since dIlk(t)/Ih(t) is an imperfect proxy for 
d1tk(t)!1tk(t), the coefficient for CPI inflation in a regression of MnS on MnIIl/IIk is expected 
to be closer to zero than in the homothetic case. Two, in the regression (IV.S), the coefficients 
for the true inflation rates and the growths in nominal spending need not be identical across 
countries because the degree of risk aversion need not be equal across countries.19 Imposing a 
single coefficient for Mn(M1) and -Mn(M2) will produce estimates that are neither equal to 111 
nor to 112 (and likewise for the inflation terms). Three, the risk aversion coefficients need not 
be constant over time. Thus, the standard constant-coefficient regression test for PPP may be 
inappropriate. In view of all this, the poor results that are commonly obtained in regression 
tests of  relative PPP may simply be the result of misspecification of the test equation rather than 
some kind of excess volatility or irrationality.2o 
Equation (!V.2) has similar implications for cointegration tests of exchange rate models: 
The tests presented in Section III suffer from a missing-variable bias, and the fixed-coefficient 
approach may be inappropriate. In addition, like the homothecy/CRRA-model, (IV.2) is still 
consistent with PPP-like behavior in the long run, especially in high-inflation samples: If  long-
run cumulative marginal inflation rates follow similar time paths as cumulative average inflation 
rates and money supply data, it will again be difficult to distinguish between the roles of these 
three variables if, as Proposition 4 predicts, the true coefficients of the three variables sum to 
unity. Thus, the fact that the country-by-country tests of Section III appear to accept a rather 
191n  their regression tests of relative PPP, Apte, Kane, and Sercu (1994) allow for different coefficients 
across countries, and they test for equality. The only instances where the equality hypothesis is not rejected 
is when the power of the test is low. 
20See the survey article by Frankel and Rose (1994) for the evidence on bubbles in exchange rates. 30 
wide range of risk-aversion parameters can also be consistent with the generalized model 
(IV.2). 
v.  Conclusion 
Much of the literature on exchange rate determination is based on  PPP, with PPP being 
justified on the basis of the consumption opportunity set (frictionless commodity arbitrage). In 
contrast, the standard micro-economics paradigm views relative prices-and, hence, also 
exchange rates-as jointly determined by consumption opportunity sets and preferences. We 
accordingly characterize the equilibrium exchange rate in a general equilibrium economy with 
imperfect commodity markets. We can avoid strong restrictions on the output processes or on 
preferences because, for our purpose, there is no need to specify the link between the exchange 
rate and the underlying exogenous variables. In such a model,  the real exchange rate is 
determined by differences in initial wealths-the currencies of richer countries tend to  be 
overvalued, by PPP standards-and by differences in marginal utilities of total consumption. 
In the special case of homothetic Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions, 
the model implies that there is a missing variable in the PPP equation, the ratio of nominal 
spendings, and that the ceteris paribus effect of higher domestic prices is a drop in the value of 
foreign currencies rather than a rise (as predicted by PPP). In models with non-homothetic, 
non-CRRA utility functions  the exchange rate change depends not only on the standard 
("average") inflation differential across countries (as in the PPP model) but also on the inflation 
differential computed on the basis of marginal consumption weights, growth in real spending, 
and the possibly time-varying degree of risk aversion in the two countries. Thus, standard 
regression or cointegration tests of PPP suffer from missing-variables biases and ignore 
variations in risk aversions across countries and over time. 
We also present cointegration test of the homothecy/CRRA version of the equilibrium 
exchange rate model. The results of empirical testing appear to yield few defmitive conclusions; 
in  that  sense  they  seem  to  accord  with  an  observation  of Froot  and  Rogoff(1994): 31 
"cointegration approaches have sometimes created as much confusion as clarity on the issue of 
PPP." One clear implication, however, is that a long-run equilibrium PPP relation between 
nominal exchange rates and the relevant price levels does emerge if money stocks are allowed 
to playa role in the short-run dynamics of the system, next to (and independently of) the price 
levels.  Given  that one lets  money  supplies play this  role,  the  hypothesis  of stationary 
combinations represented by equation (n.lO) receives some support for values of risk aversion 
parameters which are both theoretically and empirically acceptable when tested for one country 
at the time. A related conclusion is that the structure of equilibrium relations revealed by-or 
extracted from-a given data set depend crucially upon the specification of the V  AR model in 
levels, in particular which variables are included in and excluded from the system being 
estimated. 
We see a double challenge for future research in this area. First, more powerful tests are 
needed to  sort out the roles of nominal spending and prices in the long-run relationship. 
Second, one needs to find an explanation for the empirical result that nominal money stocks 
seem to play an independent role in the short-term dynamics. In a dichotomized model as ours, 
only real spending matters. Possible approaches could be fluctuations in the velocity of money, 
or money-in-the-utility-function effects. Both routes suggest that interest rates should be 
incorporated into the model; and interest rate changes are likely to be related to short-term 
fluctuations in money supplies. Glossary  to  Notation 
Arranged alphabetically 
32 
Ckj(t)  consumption of goodj in country k at time t 
£k(t)  vector of consumption quantities Ckj(t) of goodj (=1, ... , N) in country k 










- Mk a2v  tdaMk2  d  fl··  k  .  (.  al  )  =  aVwaMk  '  egree 0  re atIve ns  averSIOn  ill re  terms 
subscript used to refer to a particular good 
subscript used to refer to a particular country (k =  1 is the home country) 
=  aV(~~~(tr(t)) , the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in 
country k 
number of countries 
amount of nominal spending in country k 
number of goods 
number of shares of asset j held in investor's portfolio 
price level, computed on the basis of average consumption 
d1ttd1tk =  inflation, computed on the basis of marginal consumption 
the local currency price of good j in country k 
log Ilk(t) 
relative weight assigned by the central planner to each country (81 = 1) 
subjective discount rate 
nominal exchange rate (nominal value of one unit of  foreign currency) 
function that is linear homogenous in consumption quantities 
utility function of the representative investor in country k 
the period-by-period utility of the central planner (derived from current 
consumption aggregated over all M countries) 
the indirect utility of nominal spending in country k 
the indirect utility of nominal spending in the linear homogenous case 
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Appendix:  A  Brief Review  of Cointegration  Analysis 
Cointegration analysis was pioneered by Granger(1981) and developed by, among others, 
Engle and Granger (1987), Phillips (1990), Stock and Watson (1988) and more recently by 
Johansen (1988,1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990,1992). A lucid and relatively non-
technical exposition of the main ideas can be found in Dickey and Rossana(1994). 
Suppose that our objective is to do a cointegration analysis among p variables yp,t, 
grouped into a vector Yt.  Next, consider the non-stationary, k-th order vector autoregression 
01 AR) in levels of the vector Yt 
Yt =  Il + <1>1  Yt-1  + <1>2 Yt-2  +  ...... + <l>k Yt-k + et ,  (III. 1) 
where each <l>i is a pxp matrix of unknown coefficients, p being the number of elements in Yt. 
Since we wish to investigate stationarity by linear combination rather than by differencing, 
equation (111.1) is re-written in an equivalent error correction form: 
.1.Yt =  11 .1.Yt-1  +  ........ + 1k-1  .1.Yt-k+1  +  ~ Yt-k  +  Il  + et·  (III. 2) 
The Johansen procedure consists of estimating the V  AR in levels, equation (111.1), under the 
null hypothesis that the matrix ~ is of rank r < p. This implies that ~ can be written as ~ = a W 
where a and ~ are pxr matrices. Economically this means that while the vector Yt may be non-
stationary, there may exist r linear combinations of Yt, given by f3'  yt, which are stationary. 
These represent the long-run relationships between elements of y, while the parameters a are 
measures of the speed of convergence toward the long-run equilibrium. In the two-variable 
case with  one lag,  for example,  we  have  ~ = [0.1, 0.2]'  [~l, ~2]; so  in this case (III.2) 
simplifies to 
111 .1.Yl,t-1 + 112 .1.Y2,t-1  + 0.1  [~1 Yl,t-1 + ~2 Y2,t-d' + III  + EI,t , 
121 .1.Y1,t-1  + 122 .1.Y2,t-1  + 0.2  WI  Yl,t-1 + ~2 Y2,t-d' + 112  + e2,t . 34 
The change in, for example, variable Yl is seen to consists of two parts. One part represents the 
short-term dynamics  of Yl  and is given by rll ~Yl,t-l + r12  ~Y2,t-l. The second part 
represents the partial adjustment towards the long-term relationship: Yl is drifting up (down) if 
Yl  is below (above) the long-term relationship Yl  = Y - (~2/~1) Y2,21  and the  speed of 
adjustment is represented by the parameter al. The Johansen full-information, maximum-
likelihood procedure allows testing for various values of r, estimation of the parameters in a 
and ~  and tests of hypotheses about ~. 
The implementation of the  Johansen procedure involves running a  set of OLS 
regressions and solving a number of eigenvalue problems. A brief outline the computational 
steps involved is presented here. Mathematical details are in the various papers of  Johansen and 
Johansen and Juselius cited above. A very lucid treatment can be found in Hamilton(1994). 
The computational steps are as follows:22 
1.  Run OLS regressions of AYt on AYt-1, ... AYt-k+1  and a constant term. The number of lags k 
must be chosen so that the regression residuals have no serial correlation. Denote the pxl 
vector of residuals by elt. 
2.  Run OLS regressions of  Yt-k on the same variables and a constant term. Denote the residual 
vector by e2t. 
3.  Compute the following matrices: 
1  T  , 
Ell = T  L  eltelt 
t=1 
where T is the number of observations used in estimation. 
4.  Compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix 
21 In equation (III.3),  y is part of Jl. 
22The version described here is the one in which no constraints are imposed on the intercept terms (l in 
(22) and (23). This allows for r constant terms in the r cointegrating relations as well as p-r time trends in 
elements of y. For details see Hamilton(1994), p.643-44. In the case of the exchange rate equations, the 
constants predicted by our model are log(9i). 35 
Let the ordered eigenvalues be Al  > AZ >  ... >Ap  and the corresponding eigenvectors be 
aI···ap. 
5.  Vectors a 1  ...  ar associated with the r largest eigenvalues provide the basis for the space of 
cointegrating relations;  that is,  any cointegrating vector can be written as  a  linear 
combination of these r vectors. A nonnalization suggested by Johansen is (ai)' (Ezz) (ai) = 
1. Let the nonnalized vectors be VI ...  Vr. 
6.  The MLE of the pxr matrix p  in (24) is given by b= (VI ...  vr), and the MLE of a. is given 
by a = E12b. 36 
Figure  1 
Key to Figure 1. The figure on the left assumes a one-good, two-country economy with endowments Q = 
(ql> q2)·  As  there is but one good, vk  equals Ck.  There is  a proportional shipment cost, t. Thus, if the 
consumption point V = (VI, V2)  is above and to the left of Q-that is, when country 1 is importing-the 
consumption opportunity set has a slope -dvI/dv2 = l/(1+t). Likewise, if the consumption point V =  (Vb v2) 
is below and to the right of Q-that is, when country 1 is exporting-the consumption opportunity set has a 
slope -dvl/dv2 = 1  +to If  92 < (»  1, the central planner favors country 1 (2), and equilibria like V (V') with a 
real exchange rate equal to  l/(I+t) < 1 (1+t > 1) become more likely. The figure on the right assumes two 
goods, no frictions, and different consumption preference functions Uk(Ckl, Ck2). The international opportunity 
set for real spending (V2, VI)  is strictly convex. To show this it suffices to replace, in a Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, the (linear homogenous) production functions and the factor endowments, K and L, by the (linear 
homogenous) preference functions Uk{£) and the total endowments, qj =  qlj + <J2j respectively. Thus, the bound 
of the opportunity set is linear (strictly convex) if the consumption preferences are equal (different). The larger 
92, the more to the right the optimal consumption point, and the higher the MRS  (the real exchange rate for 
country 2). Table 1:  ADF  Unit Root Test Results 











Series  ADF t-test  Series  ADF t-test 
PBE  -2.6100  mBE  -3.0292 
psw  -3.2411  msw  -3.4662 
PGE  -1.9687  ffiGE  -2.2772 
PUK  -2.9429  ffiUK  -2.0361 
PJP  -2.9831  mJp  -2.7261 
Pus  -1.7852  mus  -3.6815 
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Key to Table 1.  The table shows  the  t-statistic  for  the  ADF Unit Root Test with  a time trend for  the 
seventeen variables (in log form) listed. The 95% Critical Value for 250 observations is -3.43.[Hamilton(l994), 
Table B.6, p.763, Case 4]. 
Table 2:  Lmax  and Trace Statistics for  Nominal Exchange Rates and Prices 
(p=11  series) 
Ei env.  L-max  Trace  Ho:r  Ei  env.  L-max  Trace  HO: r 
0.4289  129.41  573.96  0  0.1402  34.90  93.74  6 
0.3496  99.37  444.55  1  0.1084  26.50  58.84  7 
0.3241  90.50  345.19  2  0.0854  20.63  32.34  8 
0.2622  70.25  254.69  3  0.0467  11.06  11.71  9 
0.1886  48.28  184.44  4  0.0028  0.66  0.66  10 
0.1678  42.42  136.16  5 
Key to Table 2.  The table shows  the Eigenvalues, Lmax, and trace tests within the  ll-variable system 
(exchange rates and relative prices). The 90% critical values, from Osterwald-Lenum(I992), Table 1, p.468, are: 
p-r  1  2  3 
Lmax  18.60  12.07  2.69 
Trace  26.79  13.33  2.69 
At this ignificance level, there are nine cointegration relations in this data set. 
Table 3  Likelihood  Ratio Tests  for  the PPP(I) Hypothesis  (p=11  series) 






6.44  (2) 
9.59  (2) 
9.17  (2) 
9.16  (2) 






All Currencies simultaneously  27.96  (10)  0.00 
Key  to Table 3. The table shows the x2-tests, degrees  of freedom,  and probability values  for  the PPP 
hypothesis in the ll-variable data set without money stocks. There are nine cointegration relations in this data 
set (Table 2). In the country-by-country tests, the PPP-vector is imposed one country at the time;  that is, in 
each such test the  other eight cointegration vectors are left unrestricted.  In  the test labeled "all countries 
simultaneously", five PPP-vectors are imposed simultaneously and four are left unrestricted. 38 
Table 4:  Lmax  and Trace Statistics for  Nominal Exchange Rates, Prices, and 
Money  Stocks  (p=17  series) 
Ei env.  L-max  Trace  HO: r  Ei env.  L-max  Trace  H  :r 
0.6956  274.74  1879.65  0  0.2881  78.51  336.24  9 
0.6388  235.26  1604.92  1  0.2678  72.00  257.73  10 
0.5905  206.26  1369.65  2  0.2041  52.73  185.74  11 
0.5233  171.14  1163.39  3  0.1738  44.09  133.01  12 
0.4941  157.39  992.25  4  0.1527  38.29  88.92  13 
0.4755  149.07  834.87  5  0.1291  31.93  50.63  14 
0.4234  127.18  685.79  6  0.0774  18.61  18.70  15 
0.3901  114.23  558.62  7  0.0004  0.09  0.09  16 
Key to Table 4. The table shows  the Eigenvalues, Lmax,  and trace tests  within the  17-variable system 
(exchange rates and relative prices). See Table 2 for the 90% critical values. At this significance level, there are 
sixteen cointegration relations in this data set. 

















(p=17  series) 
Tlus = 1.25 ; Tlk =  1.50 
X2  (dt)  p-value 
1.33  (1)  0.25 
17.73  (1)  0.00 
0.32  (1)  0.57 
1.13  (1)  0.29 
0.01  (1)  0.92 
36.07  (5)  0.00 
Tlus =  0.05 ; Tlk =  0.05 
X2  (dt)  p-value 
0.26  (1)  0.61 
0.03  (1)  0.87 
0.15  (1)  0.70 
0.00  (1)  0.96 
0.85  (1)  0.36 
2.63  (5)  0.03 
Tlus =  0.60 ; Tlk = 0.40 
X2  - (dt)  p-value 
0.11  (1)  0.74 
2.70  (1)  0.10 
0.12  (1)  0.73 
0.75  (1)  0.39 
0.14  (1)  0.71 
32.21  (5)  0.00 
Tlus =  0.00 ; Tlk =  0.00 
X2  (dt)  p-value 
0.33  (1)  0.57 
0.00  (1  0.95 
0.21  (1)  0.65 
0.04  (1)  0.84 
0.94  (1)  0.33 
12.87  (5)  0.02 
Key to Table S. The table shows the X2_tests, degrees of freedom, and probability values for the PPP(2) and 
CRRA(1) hypotheses in the 17-variable data set (including money stocks). There are sixteen cointegration 
relations in this data set (Table 4). In  the country-by-country tests, the PPP- or CRRA-vector is imposed one 
country at the time; that is, in each such test the other fifteen cointegration vectors are left unrestricted. In the 
test  labeled "all countries  simultaneously", five  vectors  are imposed simultaneously  and eleven are left 
unrestricted. 39 
Table 6:  Lmax  and Trace Statistics for  Nominal  Exchange Rates and Prices 
(p=11  series) 
Ei env.  L-max  Trace  HO:r  Ei  env.  L-max  Trace  HO:r 
00.4131  123.09  492.64  0  0.1268  31.31  77.98  6 
00.2729  73.62  369.55  1  0.0915  22.16  46.67  7 
00.2586  69.12  295.93  2  0.0701  16.79  24.51  8 
00.2158  56.14  226.81  3  0.0327  7.69  7.72  9 
00.2016  52.02  170.67  4  0.0001  0.03  0.03  10 
00.1614  40.67  118.65  5 
Key to Table 6. The table shows the Eigenvalues, Lmax, and trace tests within the  ll-variable system (real 
exchange rates and real money stocks). See Table 2 for the 90% critical values. At this ignificance level, the 
Lmax (trace) statistic suggests the existence of seven (eight) cointegration relations in this data set. 
Table 7  :  Likelihood Ratio Tests for Stationarity of the Real  Exchange Rate 













l1us =  3.00 ; 11k =  2.00 
X2  (dt)  p-value 
17.73  (4)  0.07 
9.79  (4)  0.01 
25.50  (4)  0.00 
13.22  (4)  0.01 
20.37  (4)  0.02 
l1us =  0.05 ; 11k =  0.05 
X2  (df)  p-value 
23.35  (4)  0.00 
24.02  (4)  0.00 
25.19  (4)  0.00 
23.64  (4)  0.00 
22.03  (4)  0.00 
l1us =  1.25 ; 11k = 1.50 
X2  (df)  p-value 
12.98  (4)  0.01 
12.50  (4)  0.01 
21.36  (4)  0.00 
12.68  (4)  0.01 
15.61  (4)  0.00 
11us ,11k left unspecified 
X2  (df)  p-value 
5.32  (2)  0.07 
9.89  (2)  0.01 
12.46  (2)  0.00 
8.73  (2)  0.01 
7.69  (2)  0.02 
Key to Table 7. The table shows the x2-tests, degrees of freedom, and probability values for the CRRA(3) 
hypothesis in the  ll-variable data set (real exchange rates, real money stocks). We assume there are seven 
cointegration relations in the data (Table 6). In the country-by-country tests, the CRRA-vector is imposed one 
country at the time; that is, in each such test the other six cointegmtion vectors are left unrestricted. 40 
References 
Apte, P., M.  Kane, and P.  Sercu (1994):  Relative PPP in the Medium Run, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 13,602-622. 
Balassa, B. (1964): The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: a Reappraisal, Journal of  Political 
Economy, 72, 584-96 
Barten, A.  (1964), Econometrica 
Bekaert, G. (1994): Exchange Rate Volatility and Deviations for Unbiasedness in a Cash-in-
Advance model, Journal of  International Economics, 36, 29-52 
Breeden, D. (1979): An Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model with Stochastic Consumption and 
Investment Opportunities, Journal of  Financial Economics, 7, 265-296. 
Dickey, D.A. and RJ. Rossana (1994): "Cointegrated Time Series:A Guide to Estimation and 
Hypothesis Testing" Oxford Bulletin of  Economics and Statistics, 56, 325-353. 
Domnowitz, I., and C.  Hakkio (1985): Conditional Variance and the Risk Premium in the 
Foreign Exchange Market, Journal of  International Economics, 19,47-66. 
Dumas, B. (1992): Dynamic Equilibrium and the Real Exchange Rate in a Spatially Separated 
World, The Review of  Financial Studies, 5, 153-180. 
Engel, C.  M.  (1992a): On the Foreign Exchange Risk Premium in a general Equilibrium 
Model, Journal of  International Economics, 32, 305-319. 
Engel, C. M. (1992a): The Risk Premium and the Liquidity Premium in Foreign Exchange 
Markets, International Economic Review, 32,305-319. 
Engle, RF. and C.W.J. Granger (1987): Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation and Testing, Econometrica, 55, 251-276. 
Froot, K.A. and K. Rogoff (1994): Perspectives on PPP and Long-Run Real Exchange Rates, 
NBER Working Paper Series, No.4952. 
Granger, C.W.J. (1981): Some Properties of Time Series Data and their Use in Econometric 
Model Specification, Journal of  Econometrics, 16, 121-130. 
Hamilton, J.D. (1994):Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 
Hansen, H. and K. Juselius (1995): CATS in RATS Cointegration Analysis of Time Series, 
ESTIMA, Evanston Ill. 
Hodrick, R.J., and S.  Srivastava (1986): The Covariation of Risk Premiums and Expected 
Future Exchange Rates, Journal of  International Money and Finance, 5 (Supplement), 
S5-21 
Johansen, S.  (1988): Statistical Analysis of Conintegration Vectors, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 12, 231-254. 
Johansen, S. (1991): Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian 
Vector Autoregressive Models, Econometrica, 59, 1551-1580. 
Johansen, S.  and K. Juselius (1990): Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on 
Co integration-with Applications  to  the  Demand for Money,  Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 52, 169-210. 
Johansen,  S.  and K.  Juselius  (1992):  Testing Structural Hypotheses in  a  Multivariate 
Co integration Analysis of the PPP and the UIP for UK, Journal of  Econometrics, 53, 
Lucas, R  (1982): Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World, Journal 
of  Monetary Economics 10, 335-359. 
Lewis, K.,  Puzzles in International Financial Markets, Working paper, Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, forthcoming  in Grossman, G., and K.  Rogoff, eds., 41 
Handbook of  International Economics, North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Mark, N. (1985): On Time-Varying Risk Premia in the Foreign Exchange Market, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 16, 3-18 
Nessen,  M.  (1994):  Common Trends in  Prices and Exchange Rates-Tests of Long-Run 
Purchasing Power Parity, Essay I in Essays on Exchange Rates and International 
Finance,  Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Finance,  Stockholm 
School of Economics. 
Osterwald-Lenum, M. (1992): A Note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the 
Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics, Oxford Bulletin of  Economics 
and Statistics, 54,461-471. 
Phillips, P.C.B. (1990): Optimal Inference in Cointegrated Systems, Econometrica, 59, 283-
306. 
Samuelson, P.  (1964): Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 46, 145-54/ 
Samuelson, P., and S.  Swamy (1974): Invariant Index Numbers and Canonical Duality: 
Survey and Synthesis, American Economic Review, 64, 566-593. 
Singleton, K. (1990): Specification and Estimation of Intertemporal Asset Pricing Models, in 
B. Friedman and F. Hahn, eds: Handbook of  Monetary Economics (North Holland, 
Amsterdam). 
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson (1988): Testing for Common Trends, Journal of  the American 
Statistical Association, 83, 1097-1107. 
Stockman, A.  (1980):  A  Theory of Exchange Rate Determination, Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 673-698. 
Stockman, A. and H. Dellas (1989): International Portfolio Nondiversification and Exchange 
Rate Variability, Journal of  International Economics, 26, 261-290. 
Stulz, R.  (1987): An Equilibrium Model of Exchange Rate Determination and Asset Pricing 
with Nontraded Goods and Imperfect Information, Journal of  Political Economy, 95, 
1024-1040. 
Svensson, L.  E.  O.  (1985a): Currency prices, terms of Trade, and Interest Rates: A General 
Equilibrium Asset Pricing Cash-in-Advance Approach, Journal of International 
Economics, 18, 17-42. 
Svensson, L. E. O. (1985b): Money and Asset Prices in a Cash-in-Advance Economy, Journal 
of  Political Economy, 93, 919-944. 